[email protected]

NGINX2Root (CVE-2026-123007): Which Open-Source Applications Ship Their Own nginx and What Operators Should Do Now

NGINX2Root (CVE-2026-123007): Which Open-Source Applications Ship Their Own nginx and What Operators Should Do Now

Editorial note: The information in this article was compiled to the best of our knowledge at the time of publication. Prices, versions, features, licensing terms and details in comparisons may change through vendor updates; the current information from the respective provider applies. Please verify the information independently, particularly before business-critical or security-related decisions. All trademarks, product names and company names mentioned belong to their respective owners. As a rule, WZ-IT is not a partner of the vendors and projects mentioned and is not officially affiliated with them; existing partnerships are stated explicitly. This text does not replace individual professional, legal or tax advice. If any information is outdated or incorrect, please write to [email protected].

CVE monitoring and patch operations instead of finding out by chance - WZ-IT records where nginx runs in your environment, including containers and applications with their own nginx, and applies updates. Book an initial consultation · Server audit · Managed open source

On 18 November 2026 the nginx project and F5 released nginx 1.30.7 (stable) and 1.31.9 (mainline). Together they fix ten security flaws (1.31.9 all ten, 1.30.7 the nine that affect the stable line), among them CVE-2026-123007, a flaw in the HTTP/2 flow control that can allow code execution without authentication. The Xint team calls five of the flaws, together with a Linux kernel flaw, NGINX2Root.

Any nginx in the unfixed range can be affected, even if it only runs as a reverse proxy in front of an application: which flaw applies depends on the compiled-in modules and the configuration. On top of that come applications that ship their own nginx: there it is not the operating system's nginx that matters but the build the project delivers. This article classifies common open-source applications and delivery forms, separates what is documented from what is assumed, and describes when switching off HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 helps as an interim solution and when it does not.

Table of contents

In short

Question Answer
Identifier NGINX2Root: five CVEs (CVE-2026-123007, -123633, -121810, -123634, -113425) according to Xint; the releases together fix ten (nginx.org)
Most consequential flaw (according to Xint) CVE-2026-123007: integer underflow in the HTTP/2 flow control, heap overflow, code execution with the privileges of the worker process possible (CVE record)
Severity CVSS 3.1: 8.1 and CVSS 4.0: 9.2, both assigned by F5 (3.1 vector: AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H); nginx.org rates the flaw as major (advisories)
Affected CVE-2026-123007: nginx Open Source 1.9.5 to 1.30.6 and 1.31.0 to 1.31.8 with HTTP/2 active; the other flaws, depending on the module, from 0.5.33, 0.6.18, 1.13.0, 1.19.7 or 1.25.0, likewise up to 1.30.6 and 1.31.8 respectively
Fixed nginx 1.31.9 (mainline: all ten) and 1.30.7 (stable: nine, CVE-2026-120993 only affects mainline); for older lines no fixed release from nginx.org, distribution packages with backports there
Prerequisite The configuration enables the respective feature: HTTP/2, HTTP/3, TLS 1.3, mail proxy, or resolver with SSI and mirror; the attacker does not need to authenticate
Interim measure Switching off HTTP/2 blocks only CVE-2026-123007 and CVE-2026-123633 (Xint, Wiz); F5 lists "None" as the workaround for both flaws
Exploitation As of 21 November 2026 we are not aware of any report of exploitation (our own statement, not proof); none of the ten CVEs in the CISA KEV catalog (catalog version of 20 November), CISA SSVC "Exploitation: none" for all ten (18 November); public proof of concept from Rapid7 with narrow prerequisites
Root on the host The nginx attack runs with the privileges of the worker process, an unprivileged user in common installations; root then requires a further flaw. Xint chains with a Linux kernel flaw (SCTP). A probably matching fix (author date 12 November, taken into the networking tree on 16 November, not explicitly confirmed by Xint) is in the mainline branch, but, according to our comparison of the tags through the GitHub mirrors (as of 21 November 2026), not in the stable and longterm releases listed on 21 November

Status of the information

As of 21 November 2026. The situation keeps changing: projects publish fixed images, distributions add packages, and the discoverers are withholding exploit details. The main sources are the nginx.org advisories and the change list, the CVE records from F5, the post by Xint, the post by Wiz and the post by Rapid7. Which statements rest on vendor sources and which on repository reviews is explained in the section Status and methodology.

What happened on 18 November 2026

nginx 1.30.7 and 1.31.9 were released on 18 November 2026 (change list 1.31.9, 1.30.7). F5 published the CVE records the same day at 15:23 UTC. The table shows all ten flaws with the information from the CVE records and from nginx.org.

CVE Component and condition Affected from nginx.org CVSS 3.1 / 4.0
CVE-2026-123007 HTTP/2 flow control: integer underflow, heap overflow, crash or code execution 1.9.5 major 8.1 / 9.2
CVE-2026-123633 HTTP/2 with forwarding to a backend: use-after-free when worker_connections run low 1.19.7 medium 8.1 / 9.2
CVE-2026-121810 HTTP/3: use-after-free in the worker 1.25.0 medium 8.1 / 9.2
CVE-2026-123634 Resolver: proxy_pass with variables in the server name and SSI or mirror triggering a subrequest, use-after-free 0.6.18 medium 8.1 / 9.2
CVE-2026-113425 Mail proxy: use-after-free 0.5.33 major 8.1 / 9.2
CVE-2026-118899 listen ... ssl with TLS 1.3: infinite loop while reading the request body, denial of service 1.13.0 major 7.5 / 8.7
CVE-2026-120993 stream: PROXY protocol v2 with dynamic certificate loading, worker crash 1.31.4 (mainline only) minor 5.3 / 6.9
CVE-2026-125283 alias with try_files and map: worker crash 0.9.6 minor 5.3 / 6.9
CVE-2026-120967 stream: client certificates verified with the configuration of the default server instead of by SNI 1.25.5 medium 4.8 / 6.3
CVE-2026-123640 stream ssl_preread: malformed ClientHello message distorts routing 1.15.2 minor 5.3 / 6.9

1.31.9 fixes all ten flaws, 1.30.7 the nine that affect the stable line: CVE-2026-120993 only affects the mainline range 1.31.4 to 1.31.8 (nginx.org, change list 1.30.7). For CVE-2026-113425, nginx.org and F5 name 0.5.33 as the first affected version, Xint 0.5.15 for its own attack path; the table follows nginx.org. For CVE-2026-121810, the F5 record names 1.25.09 as the first affected version and nginx.org 1.25.0; the table follows nginx.org here as well. The column "Affected from" only names the first affected version: for all flaws except CVE-2026-120993 the affected range ends per line at 1.30.6 (stable) and 1.31.8 (mainline), and 1.30.7 and 1.31.9 are fixed (nginx.org and Wiz give "to 1.31.8" and list 1.30.7 separately as not affected). For NGINX Plus, Rapid7 and Wiz name the fixes 37.0.8.1 and 37.3.0.1 for CVE-2026-123007.

The count of "five critical flaws" only holds under F5's CVSS 4.0 rating: exactly CVE-2026-123007, -123633, -121810, -123634 and -113425 carry 9.2, and these are the five NGINX2Root identifiers. nginx.org, on the other hand, rates CVE-2026-123007, -118899 and -113425 as major, and Red Hat rates four of the five as Critical and CVE-2026-123634 as Important (Red Hat). The ratings are assessments by the respective body and do not coincide.

According to Xint, CVE-2026-123007 has been present since HTTP/2 was introduced in nginx 1.9.5. The fix commit describes the cause: when a stream is terminated, its unsent payload is credited back to the connection's flow control window, which can thereby exceed the permitted maximum; this leads to a wrong buffer size and to memory corruption.

When the flaws apply: reverse proxy, modules and configuration

Three conditions have to be met together:

  1. An unfixed nginx build, that is Open Source up to 1.30.6 and 1.31.0 to 1.31.8 (CVE-2026-120993: only 1.31.4 to 1.31.8) without a backport from the distribution.
  2. The module is in the binary. According to the nginx documentation the HTTP/2 module is not built by default, nor is the HTTP/3 module.
  3. The configuration enables the feature. According to the documentation HTTP/2 is off by default (directive http2, since 1.25.1; before that the http2 parameter of listen).

Anyone running nginx as a reverse proxy in front of an application is, with the same version and configuration, affected just like an operator serving static pages: the flaws are in nginx, not in the application behind it. Whether Nextcloud, Grafana, a Java application or a custom application sits behind it changes nothing. Which flaw belongs to which configuration:

Your nginx configuration Affected flaws
HTTPS listener with HTTP/2 (listen 443 ssl http2; or http2 on;) CVE-2026-123007; with forwarding to a backend and worker_connections running low also CVE-2026-123633 (Xint)
listen ... ssl in the http block with TLS 1.3, even without HTTP/2 CVE-2026-118899 (denial of service through a specially crafted TLS connection); TLS 1.3 has been the default since nginx 1.23.4 (documentation)
HTTP/3 (listen ... quic) CVE-2026-121810
proxy_pass with variables in the server name, resolver and SSI or mirror CVE-2026-123634
Mail proxy (mail block with proxy on and auth_http) CVE-2026-113425
alias with try_files and map CVE-2026-125283 (crash)
stream with ssl_verify_client, ssl_preread or PROXY protocol v2 and dynamic certificates CVE-2026-120967, CVE-2026-123640, CVE-2026-120993

Check the configuration. The commands come from the post by Xint; the quic extension adds a search for HTTP/3:

nginx -v 2>&1
nginx -V 2>&1 | grep -q -- '--with-http_v2_module' && echo 'HTTP2_MODULE=present' || echo 'HTTP2_MODULE=absent'
sudo nginx -T 2>&1 | sed 's/#.*//' | grep -nE 'listen[[:space:]].*(http2|quic)|^[[:space:]]*http2[[:space:]]+on[[:space:]]*;'
# from outside: is HTTP/2 negotiated?
openssl s_client -connect HOST:443 -servername HOST -alpn h2 </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -E 'ALPN protocol:|No ALPN negotiated'

nginx -T reads the configuration from disk; the running one can differ. If a CDN or proxy sits in front of nginx, the test only reaches that; it also has to be run directly against the nginx.

Which open-source applications ship their own nginx

The table names applications and delivery forms for which the statement could be documented in a repository, Dockerfile, release notes or registry. As with any nginx flaw, "affected" means: a build without the fix for the respective flaw plus matching configuration; lower version bounds and modules differ per CVE. The status applies as of 21 November 2026.

Application How nginx gets in Affected? Fixed state or what to do Source
GitLab (Omnibus package, Docker image) Its own nginx build from the nginx sources in the Omnibus package, with the HTTP/2 module, without HTTP/3 and mail modules; the Docker image contains the Omnibus package Yes with HTTPS operation: HTTP/2 is the default (http2_enabled = true), so CVE-2026-123007 and, when worker_connections run low, CVE-2026-123633, plus CVE-2026-118899; the HTTP/3 and mail flaws do not apply because the modules are missing. With GitLab's nginx switched off and an external web server, that server's state counts No fixed nginx as of 21 Nov.: according to nginx.rb, 19.6.1, 19.5.8 and 19.4.10 (patch release of 20 Nov.) and master contain nginx 1.31.7, and the patch release notes name no nginx version change. Until a release with 1.31.9: gitlab_rails['nginx']['http2_enabled'] = false, then gitlab-ctl reconfigure. The key applies to the main vhost; further vhosts served by the bundled nginx, such as Registry, Pages or a separate KAS vhost (gitlab_kas['nginx']['http2_enabled']), have their own settings and must be checked separately. Not possible with grpcs for KAS, because HTTP/2 is required nginx.rb, release notes
mailcow Container nginx-mailcow based on the nginx Alpine image; HTTP/2 is on (http2 on;) Yes up to release 2026-11 (image 1.30.6-2) Fixed since release 2026-11a of 18 Nov. (image 1.30.7-1); the release notes name, among others, CVE-2026-123007, -123633 and -118899. Update with update.sh Release 2026-11a
Nginx Proxy Manager Base image with OpenResty; 2.17.0 contains OpenResty 1.31.8.1 (nginx 1.31.8) Yes up to 2.17.0; 2.17.1 fixed for two flaws only 2.17.1 of 19 Nov.: the release notes speak generally of nginx2root backports; the backport commit in the base image contains patches for CVE-2026-123007 and CVE-2026-123633, and no fix is documented for the other flaws. Pull the image again, recreate the container Release 2.17.1, backport commit
ingress-nginx for Kubernetes Controller image with its own nginx build (build.sh: nginx 1.27.1) with HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 modules; use-http2 is "true" by default Yes for the HTTP/2 flaws and, with the default HTTPS listener (listen ... ssl, ssl-protocols default TLSv1.2 TLSv1.3), for CVE-2026-118899; further flaws depending on the configuration A fix is not planned: repository archived, according to the Kubernetes blog no releases and security updates after March 2026. Interim measure for the two HTTP/2 flaws: use-http2: "false" in the ConfigMap (derived from documentation and template, not a vendor recommendation); it does not cover CVE-2026-118899 and the other flaws; long term, move to a maintained controller or the Gateway API Repository, build.sh, ConfigMap documentation, listener code, Kubernetes blog
F5 NGINX Ingress Controller, NGINX Gateway Fabric nginx (Open Source or Plus) in the controller or data plane image Yes for versions with nginx up to 1.30.6 or 1.31.0 to 1.31.8, such as Ingress Controller 5.7.1 (nginx 1.31.8) Ingress Controller 5.8.0 (18 Nov.): nginx 1.31.9 or Plus R37.3.0.1; Gateway Fabric 2.9.0 (18 Nov.): nginx 1.31.9 Changelog, Dockerfile
OpenResty and gateways built on it Bundles the nginx core with patches; tag v1.31.8.1 contains nginx 1.31.8 Yes, as far as on v1.31.8.1 or older No release tag with nginx 1.31.9 on 21 Nov. (newest tag: v1.31.8.1); in the repository, master was switched to the nginx 1.31.9 core on 19 Nov. (commit "update openresty to 1.31.9.1"), and backport patches for nine of the ten flaws are available for the nginx 1.27.1 line. Applications built on OpenResty depend on the image vendor Commit, core update, tags
Official Docker image nginx and application images built on it nginx.org packages in the Debian or Alpine image Yes for version tags up to 1.30.6 and from 1.31.0 to 1.31.8, such as 1.28.3, 1.29.8, 1.31.8 Fixed: tags 1.31.9, latest, 1.30.7, stable and the Alpine variants (updated on 19 and 20 Nov. according to Docker Hub); older version tags contain their respective nginx version. Rebuild your own images docker-nginx, Docker Hub
Image nginx-unprivileged nginx.org packages, runs without root Yes when pulled from the old repository nginxinc/nginx-unprivileged On 21 Nov. the newest version tags there are 1.31.7 and 1.30.6 (19 Oct.); 1.30.7 and 1.31.9 do not exist there. Fixed in the new repository nginx/nginx-unprivileged: 1.31.9 and 1.30.7 (18 Nov.) Docker Hub, README
linuxserver.io images, such as SWAG Alpine package nginx through the base image baseimage-alpine-nginx Yes, as long as the image was built before the Alpine update Base images with the fixed Alpine package: nginx 1.30.7-r0 (Alpine 3.24, first fixed build on 18 Nov.) or 1.28.3-r8 (3.23 and 3.22, since 19 Nov.); further rebuilds followed on 20 Nov., including 1.28.3-r9 for 3.23 and 3.22. According to its Dockerfile, SWAG builds on baseimage-alpine-nginx:3.24; the SWAG release notes (latest ls503 of 21 Nov.) only name certbot, so the nginx state in the image cannot be read from them. Check the state in the container with nginx -v Base image, SWAG
Discourse Debian package nginx-light in the base image (Debian trixie) Yes, as long as the base image contains a Debian package older than 1.26.3-3+deb13u11 Since 19 Nov. discourse_docker is back on the Debian package 1.26.3-3+deb13u11, which contains all nine fixes; rebuild the container with ./launcher rebuild app Commit
Zammad (Docker) Debian package nginx in the Zammad image (base ruby slim-trixie), container zammad-nginx In our assessment hardly, given the shipped configuration: there nginx only listens on a plain-text port, without ssl, http2, mirror or SSI. The TLS proxy in front counts separately Check the package state in the image and pull the current image; the package state in the image was not opened Dockerfile, docker-entrypoint
Jitsi (docker-jitsi-meet) Debian package nginx-extras in the web container (Debian trixie) Yes for packages older than 1.26.3-3+deb13u11: the template default sets ssl http2 for the HTTPS listener (port 8443) unless HTTPS is switched off (DISABLE_HTTPS) Release stable-11509-1 of 20 Nov., the notes do not mention nginx; check the package state in the image web/Dockerfile, listener template
Nextcloud All-in-One No nginx in the containers apache and mastercontainer (according to their Dockerfiles): apache uses Caddy and Apache httpd, mastercontainer Caddy and PHP-FPM No, for the containers apache and mastercontainer No measure in these two containers; the other AIO containers were not checked, an nginx as upstream proxy and third-party images such as office containers have to be checked separately Dockerfile apache, Dockerfile mastercontainer

Applications whose nginx origin or state could not be documented in the repository are not included. The list is therefore not complete.

When switching off HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 helps and when it does not

Two of the ten flaws require HTTP/2: CVE-2026-123007 and CVE-2026-123633. Xint and Wiz name switching off HTTP/2 as an interim measure until the update. In the CVE records of both flaws F5 lists "None" as the workaround; the effect follows from the prerequisite and not from a vendor recommendation.

CVE Measure according to F5 (CVE record) Measure according to Xint and Wiz Blocked by switching off HTTP/2?
CVE-2026-123007 None Switch off HTTP/2 Yes
CVE-2026-123633 None Switch off HTTP/2 Yes
CVE-2026-121810 None Remove QUIC listeners, http3 off, Alt-Svc 'clear' No
CVE-2026-123634 proxy_pass without variables in the server name, avoid SSI and mirror Fixed upstream groups instead of variables; switching off mirror alone is not enough No
CVE-2026-113425 Restrict listeners to trusted networks Bind mail listeners to loopback or restrict by firewall No
CVE-2026-118899 None Not covered No
CVE-2026-120993 proxy_protocol off or v1; or ssl_session_tickets off and ssl_session_cache off Not covered No
CVE-2026-125283 Use named instead of unnamed regex captures and do not reuse the same capture variable in other regex matches or for other purposes Not covered No
CVE-2026-120967 ssl_verify_client on in the default server or a dedicated listener Not covered No
CVE-2026-123640 Replace ssl_preread with TLS termination in nginx Not covered No

How HTTP/2 is switched off (Xint, Wiz). From nginx 1.25.1 the directive http2 in the server block applies; older versions remove the parameter from listen:

server {
    listen 443 ssl;      # without "http2" in the listen line
    http2 off;           # nginx from 1.25.1
}

Then nginx -t, reload and prove on the listener that HTTP/2 is no longer offered:

sudo nginx -t && sudo nginx -s reload
openssl s_client -connect HOST:443 -servername HOST -alpn h2 </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -F 'ALPN protocol: h2'
# no output means: HTTP/2 is no longer offered (a connection failure also gives no output)

When the measure helps: the nginx is in the unfixed range, HTTP/2 is on, and the clients get by with HTTP/1.1. Browsers then fall back to HTTP/1.1. After the update HTTP/2 is enabled again (Wiz).

When it does not help:

  • The other eight flaws are not mitigated by it. Whether they apply depends on module and configuration. The TLS 1.3 flaw CVE-2026-118899 concerns listen ... ssl even without HTTP/2, and with HTTP/3 listeners CVE-2026-121810 remains.
  • Native gRPC through the affected listener stops working. Xint names services that require HTTP/2, such as native gRPC; the nginx gRPC module requires the HTTP/2 module. Clients that support HTTP/1.1 keep working. GitLab also aborts the configuration when the KAS address uses grpcs:// and HTTP/2 is off on the KAS vhost.
  • Shared listeners. Xint advises checking all server blocks on the same address and port. If one host keeps HTTP/2 on, the listener can keep offering HTTP/2; that is why the openssl test belongs to every host.
  • A reload does not end existing connections. Old workers keep their HTTP/2 connections and the old configuration. They show up as nginx: worker process is shutting down; if they stay, a restart through the service manager helps (Xint).
  • A CDN or WAF in front does not replace the measure. Wiz writes that CDNs and WAFs that terminate HTTP/2 may mitigate parts of the exploit, depending on the implementation. A directly reachable nginx remains attackable.
  • It remains an interim solution. Only the update delivers the complete vendor fix.

Update paths by deployment type

Operating system package

Packages often keep the version number of the upstream state and name the fix in the changelog. As of 21 November 2026:

Distribution Fixed package state Source
Debian 13 (trixie) 1.26.3-3+deb13u11, DSA-6642-1 of 19 Nov. Tracker, changelog
Debian 12 (bookworm) 1.22.1-9+deb12u11, DLA-4918-1 of 19 Nov. Tracker
Ubuntu 26.04 LTS 1.28.3-2ubuntu1.13 Ubuntu
Ubuntu 24.04 LTS 1.24.0-2ubuntu7.20 Ubuntu
Ubuntu 22.04 LTS 1.18.0-6ubuntu14.23; the fix for CVE-2026-118899 is in 1.18.0-6ubuntu14.24 Ubuntu
Ubuntu 20.04, 18.04, 16.04 ESM packages through Ubuntu Pro (for CVE-2026-123007) Ubuntu
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10, 9, 8 Errata of 20 Nov.: RHSA-2026:100744 (RHEL 10), RHSA-2026:100745, 100746 and 100748 (RHEL 9), RHSA-2026:100747 (RHEL 8) Red Hat
Alpine 1.30.7-r0 in 3.24 and edge; at least 1.28.3-r8 in 3.23 and 3.22 secdb
nginx.org packages, own build 1.30.7 (stable) or 1.31.9 (mainline) nginx.org

After the package update nginx has to restart or go through a supported live binary upgrade; a reload does not replace the running executable (Xint).

Docker image and Compose

  • Pull the image again, recreate the container: docker compose pull && docker compose up -d --force-recreate. Restarting the old container is not enough because the executable lives in the image.
  • Check version tags. A tag such as nginx:1.28.3 contains nginx 1.28.3 (last updated on 7 April 2026 according to Docker Hub). Only 1.30.7, 1.31.9 and their aliases are fixed.
  • The right repository. nginx-unprivileged delivers fixed tags only under nginx/nginx-unprivileged.
  • Rebuild derived images with docker build --pull so that the current base image is pulled, and check the state in the built image (nginx -v, package state).
  • Applications with their own nginx (GitLab, mailcow, Nginx Proxy Manager, Discourse) follow the project's release; the table above names the state.

Kubernetes

  • ingress-nginx gets no fix any more according to the project. The alternatives are a maintained controller such as the F5 NGINX Ingress Controller 5.8.0 or a Gateway API implementation. Until the switch, use-http2: "false" remains as a derived interim measure for the two HTTP/2 flaws (not a vendor recommendation); it does not cover CVE-2026-118899, the HTTP/3 and other flaws.
  • F5 NGINX Ingress Controller and Gateway Fabric: update to 5.8.0 or 2.9.0; the Helm chart and the image are switched together.
  • Find the affected pods:
kubectl get pods -A -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.namespace}{"\t"}{.metadata.name}{"\t"}{range .spec.containers[*]}{.image}{" "}{end}{"\n"}{end}' | grep -i nginx
kubectl -n <namespace> exec <controller-pod> -- nginx -v

Checking your own version

For distribution packages and images, the version number alone does not show whether the fix is included. What gets checked is what is actually running:

# Debian and Ubuntu: package state and changelog (after the update)
dpkg -l | grep -E '^ii +nginx'
apt changelog nginx | grep -m1 CVE-2026-123007

# RHEL, Rocky, Alma
rpm -q nginx
rpm -q --changelog nginx | grep -m1 CVE-2026-123007

# Alpine
apk info -v nginx

# Docker container
docker exec <container> nginx -v
docker exec <container> nginx -V 2>&1 | grep -oE 'with-http_v2_module|with-http_v3_module|with-mail'

# GitLab Omnibus (path from the build prefix)
sudo /opt/gitlab/embedded/sbin/nginx -v

The changelog command shows a hit if the package names the identifier in its changelog; the Debian and Ubuntu changelogs name the identifiers (Debian, Ubuntu). Whether the new process is running after the update is shown by the start time of the master process (ps -C nginx -o pid,lstart,cmd).

What to do now

The order is our recommendation, not a vendor requirement.

  1. Take inventory. Where does nginx run: on hosts, in containers, in applications with their own nginx, in the Kubernetes cluster, in appliances? The running processes count, not just the installed packages.
  2. Clarify the origin. Record for each system whether nginx comes from the operating system, an image, nginx.org or the application. This determines who delivers the fix.
  3. Check the configuration. HTTP/2, HTTP/3, TLS 1.3, mail proxy, stream and resolver with SSI or mirror determine which of the ten flaws apply in a given case.
  4. Prioritize. First nginx instances reachable from the internet with HTTP/2, then authentication services and systems with access to internal networks.
  5. Secure temporarily where no fix exists yet. Switch off HTTP/2 per listener, restart and prove it on the listener (GitLab, ingress-nginx, Nginx Proxy Manager until an image with all fixes; 2.17.1 only fixes the two HTTP/2 flaws).
  6. Update. Apply packages, pull or build images again, recreate containers, restart nginx and check the running state.
  7. Plan a replacement for ingress-nginx. A fixed state is not planned.
  8. Mind the host kernel. On hosts that do not need SCTP, block the module (see the section on exploitation).
  9. Monitor. Watch for repeated worker crashes, core dumps and processes started by nginx (Wiz). An update does not remove a compromise that has already happened (our assessment).

Is NGINX2Root being exploited?

As of 21 November 2026 we are not aware of any report of exploitation. That is our own statement and not proof that there is none. What is documented: none of the ten CVEs is in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (catalog version 2026.11.20 of 20 November, unchanged on 21 November), and the CISA SSVC entries in the CVE records show "Exploitation: none" for all ten on 18 November. Both are snapshots.

A proof of concept from Rapid7 for CVE-2026-123007 is public. The description from Rapid7 names narrow prerequisites:

  • Data volume: about 128 GB of HTTP/2 data. At 10 Gbit/s this takes about two minutes, at 1 Gbit/s seventeen minutes; networks below about 300 Mbit/s do not manage it because of the default connection lifetime of one hour.
  • Environment: tested against a linux/amd64 Docker image with nginx 1.31.8 and TLS. The README names several concurrent clients, a "messy" heap, too little bandwidth and a proxy in between as limits.
  • Privileges: execution runs with the privileges of the worker process; master or root have not been established.

Wiz confirms code execution with an ASLR bypass on the official builds 1.31.7 and 1.31.8 and states that it is not releasing its exploits at this time. The root cause is public, and Wiz points out that attacks may start against widespread products with identical configuration. Anyone offering HTTP/2 publicly should therefore not wait for further exploits to be published.

The chain to root. Xint chained CVE-2026-123007 with a separate flaw in the SCTP subsystem of the Linux kernel and reached root on the host, including from a Docker container with nginx. Containers share the kernel with the host. On the state of the kernel fix:

  • A matching fix has the author date of 12 November 2026 and was taken into the networking tree on 16 November 2026 (committer date); it is now in the mainline branch: commit f2540da93a11 "sctp: do not free a new asoc peeled off while sendmsg slept", marked Cc: stable and found by "Xint Code". That it is the same flaw Xint describes is likely but not explicitly confirmed by Xint; the description (send path, association transferred to another socket, double free) matches.
  • According to our comparison of the tags through the GitHub mirrors (as of 21 November 2026), the stable and longterm releases listed on kernel.org on 21 November (stable 7.3.5, longterm 6.18.64 and 6.12.118 of 17 Nov.; longterm 6.6.162, 6.1.192, 5.15.225 and 5.10.274 of 6 Nov.) do not contain the commit: it is not in the tags 7.3.5, 6.18.64 and 6.12.118 of the stable repository, and the other releases are older than the commit. We did not find a CVE identifier for the flaw as of 21 November.
  • On hosts that do not need SCTP, Xint names install sctp /bin/false in a file under /etc/modprobe.d/ as a measure. This does not unload a module that is already loaded and does not disable SCTP compiled into the kernel. According to Xint, whether SCTP is reachable depends on the kernel, the modules and the container's restrictions.

Timeline

Date Event
11 October 2026 Xint discovers the flaws, report to F5 on 16 October (Xint)
21 October 2026 Wiz reports CVE-2026-123633 to F5, CVE-2026-123007 follows on 16 November (Wiz)
12 November 2026 Rapid7 reports CVE-2026-123007 to F5 (Rapid7)
16 November 2026 The probably matching kernel fix for the SCTP flaw is taken into the networking tree (author date 12 November), now in the mainline branch (commit)
18 November 2026 nginx 1.30.7 and 1.31.9, F5 advisories and CVE records (15:23 UTC), posts from Xint, Wiz and Rapid7, public PoC; mailcow 2026-11a, F5 NGINX Ingress Controller 5.8.0, Gateway Fabric 2.9.0; linuxserver.io base image for Alpine 3.24 with nginx 1.30.7-r0 (first fixed build)
19 November 2026 Debian with fixed packages (DSA-6642-1, DLA-4918-1), the Ubuntu tracker lists fixes (last updated 19 Nov.); Nginx Proxy Manager 2.17.1; Discourse switches to the Debian package; OpenResty backport in the repository; linuxserver.io base images for Alpine 3.23 and 3.22 with nginx 1.28.3-r8
20 November 2026 Red Hat errata for RHEL 8, 9 and 10; GitLab patch releases 19.6.1, 19.5.8, 19.4.10 with nginx 1.31.7; further rebuilds of the linuxserver.io base images (1.28.3-r9 for Alpine 3.23 and 3.22)

Common misconceptions

Misconception Correct
"NGINX2Root is a single flaw." It is five nginx CVEs plus one kernel flaw (Xint); the releases together fix ten CVEs (nginx.org).
"Five critical flaws, that is how nginx puts it." CVSS 4.0 9.2 is carried by CVE-2026-123007, -123633, -121810, -123634 and -113425. nginx.org rates a partly different group of three as major: CVE-2026-123007 and -113425 are also among the five, CVE-2026-118899 is not.
"Without HTTP/2 I am safe." Only for the two HTTP/2 flaws. TLS 1.3 (CVE-2026-118899), HTTP/3, mail proxy, resolver and stream have their own prerequisites.
"Switching off HTTP/2 is enough permanently." It is an interim solution for two flaws, and F5 lists "None" for it. The update remains necessary.
"nginx -v shows 1.24.0, so I am unpatched." Debian and Ubuntu keep the version number and deliver the fix as a backport. The full package version is what counts.
"I only run a reverse proxy, the application behind it is the risk." The flaws are in nginx. The application behind it is irrelevant for CVE-2026-123007.
"My image is nginx:latest or new, so it is patched." Fixed are 1.30.7, 1.31.9 and their aliases, and an already pulled latest only after pulling again. Version tags such as 1.28.3 contain their respective version, nginxinc/nginx-unprivileged has (as of 21 November) no tags with 1.30.7 or 1.31.9, and applications such as GitLab ship their own nginx.
"ingress-nginx will get an update." The project is archived; according to the Kubernetes blog no releases and security updates are planned after March 2026 (Kubernetes blog).
"With nginx an attacker gets root immediately." The code runs with worker privileges. Xint reached root only with an additional kernel flaw.
"After the update a reload is enough." That does not replace the running executable. nginx has to restart, containers have to be recreated.

Status and methodology

As of 21 November 2026, three days after publication. The technical information on versions, prerequisites and ratings comes from the nginx.org advisories and the change list, the CVE records from F5 (workaround fields, CVSS vectors, affected versions), the posts by Xint, Wiz and Rapid7, the CISA KEV catalog, the trackers of Debian, Ubuntu and Red Hat, the Alpine security data and the kernel commit. The F5 advisories on my.f5.com load only with JavaScript and could not be read; their content was checked through the CVE records and nginx.org.

The information on how the applications are delivered comes from the projects' repositories, Dockerfiles, release notes and registry data, as of 21 November. Image contents were not opened; where the package state in the image is not documented, the table says so. Not confirmed are: a CVE identifier for the SCTP flaw, the identity of the kernel commit with the flaw described by Xint, and the question of which of the other flaws apply in Nginx Proxy Manager. That we are not aware of any exploitation is our own statement, based on the CISA KEV catalog and the CISA entries in the CVE records, and not a statement from the discoverers' posts. For CVE-2026-113425 the sources differ: nginx.org and F5 name 0.5.33, Xint 0.5.15 for its own attack path. For CVE-2026-121810 the F5 record names 1.25.09 and nginx.org 1.25.0; the article follows nginx.org. nginx.org and Wiz give the version ranges as "to 1.31.8" and list 1.30.7 separately as not affected; the article names them per line, as Rapid7 and the F5 records do. The comparison of the kernel stable tags rests on the GitHub mirrors of the repositories, not on git.kernel.org. Statements such as "not fixed yet" describe the state of the linked repositories and registries on 21 November 2026 and can change. Where F5 lists "None" and Xint or Wiz name switching off HTTP/2, both statements are given side by side. Reports from news sites were used only to locate the primary sources.

Our approach at WZ-IT

  • Inventory: We record where nginx runs in your environment, including containers, the Kubernetes cluster and applications with their own nginx, and review the configuration for HTTP/2, HTTP/3, TLS 1.3, mail proxy and stream.
  • Securing: We set the interim measure per listener, restart nginx and prove the effect where no fixed state exists yet.
  • Patching: We apply package updates, pull or rebuild container images, restart the services and verify the running state.
  • Reviewing: We examine logs for worker crashes and unexpected processes and rotate credentials if a suspicion arises.
  • Documenting: We record state, measures and review results per system.
  • Operations: In managed operations, updates, CVE monitoring and backups are included; the server audit reviews existing systems once.

Further guides

Check your nginx estate without finding out by chance: We record where nginx runs in your environment, review the configuration, apply the updates and restart the services. Book an initial consultation

Sources

Timo Wevelsiep

Written by

Timo Wevelsiep

Co-Founder & CEO

Co-Founder of WZ-IT. Specialized in cloud infrastructure, open-source platforms and managed services for SMEs and enterprise clients worldwide.

Frequently Asked Questions

Answers to important questions about this topic

Customers from mid-sized business, industry and the public sector, in Germany and internationally

  • Stadtwerke Brühl
  • DGHO e.V.
  • solarwerkstatt berlin
  • Krüger Dirndl
  • ABCO Water Systems
  • Golem.de
  • EVADXB
  • nextGYM
  • AInergy
  • ml&s
  • Odiseo Solutions
  • Annota
  • ARGE
  • SweetConnect GmbH
  • Aphy AG
  • CORGOS
  • Rekorder
  • SolidProof
  • Yonju
  • Keymate
  • Paritel
  • Mr. Clipart
  • Millenium
  • Negosh
  • Führerscheinmacher
  • BTI
  • Deutsche Gesellschaft für Datenschutz
Read client reviews

Enquiry

Check your nginx estate for NGINX2Root

We inventory where nginx runs in your environment, including containers and applications with their own nginx, review the configuration, apply updates and restart the services.

  • You speak directly with Timo and Robin, who are technically responsible
  • A professional assessment of your situation
  • Concrete next steps for infrastructure, software or AI

The conversation is free and non-binding.

WZ-IT's advice on our Azure migration was technically sound and completely non-binding right from the intro call - we took away a great deal.
Jakob ÖschlbergerInno7 GmbH
Timo and Robin, founders of WZ-IT

What does your nginx environment need now?

WZ-IT's advice on our Azure migration was technically sound and completely non-binding right from the intro call - we took away a great deal.
Jakob ÖschlbergerInno7 GmbH