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Since 28 October 2026, Hetzner has been warning on its status page about CVE-2026-97631, a critical flaw in the EDK II UEFI firmware (CVSS 9.5). It concerns booting over the network with PXE, not running operation. This page summarises what is documented, what Hetzner recommends and which steps you can take today while no firmware patch exists. As of 29 October 2026.
Table of contents
- In brief
- Immediate measures: the checklist
- The vulnerability in detail
- Who is affected
- Patch status
- If a reboot is necessary
- Timeline
- Common misconceptions
- Status and methodology
- Our approach at WZ-IT
- Further guides
In brief
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| Identifier | CVE-2026-97631 (GHSA-99cj-7hg9-mp4m) |
| Severity | CVSS 4.0: 9.5, critical (AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N) |
| Component | PXE Base Code driver NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe in EDK II |
| Type | Out-of-bounds write (CWE-787, CWE-120, CWE-131) for ICMP error messages above 504 bytes |
| Attack window | Only during a PXE boot over IPv4 or IPv6 |
| Attacker | Unauthenticated, via an ICMP error message to the client's IP address |
| Running systems | Not directly at risk according to Hetzner |
| Affected at Hetzner | Dedicated servers and cloud VMs in UEFI mode |
| Patch | Upstream in the master branch, not yet available as a package or firmware update |
| Measure | Avoid reboots and Rescue System starts, temporarily block ICMP in the Hetzner Firewall if needed |
Immediate measures: the checklist
The order is chosen so that the first steps do not touch operation.
- Check whether a system runs in UEFI mode. The command comes from Hetzner:
[ -d /sys/firmware/efi ] && echo UEFI || echo BIOS. Hetzner names only systems that printUEFIas affected. - Build an inventory. Per server: UEFI or BIOS, dedicated or cloud, whether the boot path uses PXE, whether a reboot is due in the next days.
- Postpone planned reboots. Move maintenance windows, kernel updates with reboot and hardware work where this is professionally acceptable. Hetzner advises avoiding these boot processes until a solution is available.
- Avoid Rescue System starts on cloud VMs. For cloud VMs, Hetzner says the risk exists only when booting into the Rescue System.
- List automatic reboots. Watchdogs, HA fencing, automatic updates with reboot and scripts that restart servers. Where the boot path uses PXE, disable them for the duration (our assessment).
- Prepare the firewall rule. If a reboot is unavoidable, block incoming ICMP in the Hetzner Firewall (details in the section If a reboot is necessary).
- Watch the sources. Hetzner status page, security trackers of your distribution (package
edk2orovmf), BIOS and UEFI updates from hardware vendors. - Apply the patch once available. On Linux hosts through the distribution package, on bare metal through the vendor's firmware update, then reboot and verify the state.
The vulnerability in detail
According to the advisory of the EDK II project (published on 22 October 2026), the PXE Base Code driver keeps a receive request for ICMP error messages open and copies every received message into the fixed 504-byte field Mode.IcmpError in its private context structure.
The bounds check is faulty in both the IPv4 handler (PxeBcIcmpErrorDpcHandle) and the IPv6 handler (PxeBcIcmp6ErrorDpcHandle): for messages above 504 bytes, copying continues and the destination pointer advances by the cumulative rather than the fragment length. This results in a write outside the buffer.
| Aspect | Statement in the advisory |
|---|---|
| Vector | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H |
| Affected | EDK II master (as of 14 September 2026), package NetworkPkg |
| Attacker | Unauthenticated, on the network; distance does not matter |
| Time window | The entire PXE boot phase over IPv4 or IPv6 |
| Outcome 1 | Corrupted driver data and a CPU exception in the DXE core on the next ICMP error message; the boot hangs |
| Outcome 2 | If the attacker knows the target's firmware build, they can inject a forged event in the same packet and thereby trigger their own bytes in the DXE phase |
| Workaround | Not named in the advisory |
Persistent code execution is therefore not documented. The advisory describes execution in the DXE phase of the firmware, that is, before the operating system. What an attacker does with it, it does not say.
Who is affected
Hetzner names two groups when they run with UEFI:
- Dedicated servers (bare metal): The risk exists only during a reboot.
- Cloud VMs: The risk exists only when booting into the Rescue System.
Other environments. EDK II is the basis of much UEFI firmware, among others OVMF for virtual machines under KVM. Whether a specific system contains the affected component and uses PXE in its boot path depends on the firmware build and configuration. Apart from Hetzner's statements and the distribution trackers, we have no vendor statements on this. Until then: ask the vendor or hoster, do not assume.
Hetzner names only systems in UEFI mode as affected. It does not name systems in BIOS mode or running systems outside of boot as at risk.
Patch status
| Source | Status as of 29 October 2026 |
|---|---|
| EDK II pull request 13302 | Fix merged into the master branch on 15 October 2026 (merge commit fa78907): bounds checks and buffer offsets in the ICMP handlers corrected, buffer cleared before copying |
| Advisory GHSA-99cj-7hg9-mp4m | “Not patched currently”, points to the pull request |
| Hetzner | No official patch, analysis of its own environment under way |
| Debian | bookworm, trixie, forky and sid: vulnerable, no fixed package version |
| Ubuntu | All releases with the package edk2: “Needs evaluation”; Ubuntu priority Medium, CVSS base score 9.5 |
The fix in the master branch does not mean your firmware contains it. Distributions must take it into their packages and hardware vendors into their BIOS images. No dates for that have been announced so far.
If a reboot is necessary
Hetzner recommends as an additional measure to temporarily block incoming ICMP packets in the Hetzner Firewall while a reboot is running. The attack uses ICMP error messages sent to the booting system.
- Dedicated servers: Create a firewall in the Robot interface. When creating the rules, enable “Allow Hetzner Services”; Hetzner points this out explicitly.
- Cloud servers: Create a Cloud Firewall without an inbound rule for ICMP and assign it to the server; traffic that is not allowed is dropped. If the server already has a firewall that allows ICMP, temporarily remove that rule.
In practice: create the rule, perform the reboot, check the service, remove the rule again. Our assessment: while ICMP is blocked, ping and path MTU discovery do not work, so only for the duration of the reboot. The rule lowers the risk but does not replace a patch. For dedicated servers there is a documented limit: according to Hetzner's documentation ICMPv6 cannot be filtered and is always allowed, and the firewall filters only IPv4 by default. Since the advisory names PXE over IPv4 and IPv6, the block works there for IPv4 only. Whether it covers other attack paths, for example from the same network segment, is stated neither by Hetzner nor by the advisory.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 14 October 2026 | Pull request 13302 with the fix is opened at EDK II |
| 15 October 2026 | The pull request is merged into the master branch |
| 22 October 2026 | GitHub advisory GHSA-99cj-7hg9-mp4m is published |
| 28 October 2026, 17:08 UTC | Hetzner publishes the notice on its status page and advises avoiding reboots with PXE boot |
| 29 October 2026, morning (last changed 12:34 UTC) | Hetzner update: dedicated servers and cloud VMs in UEFI mode are affected; reference to the firewall measure |
Common misconceptions
- “All my servers are attackable now.” No. According to Hetzner, the risk exists only when booting over the network, not during running operation.
- “Secure Boot protects me.” No. The flaw is exploited before Secure Boot takes effect.
- “There is a patch, so I am safe.” The fix is in the source code. Packages and firmware updates that you can install do not exist yet.
- “This only affects Hetzner.” Hetzner is informing its customers, but the component is not limited to Hetzner.
- “Rebooting is now forbidden.” No. Plan it with care and, where needed, secure it with the ICMP block.
Status and methodology
As of 29 October 2026. The basis is the advisory and the pull request of the EDK II project, the Hetzner status page, the security trackers of Debian and Ubuntu, and Hetzner's firewall documentation. Statements about Hetzner come from Hetzner, those about the type of flaw and the attacker from the advisory. Our own assessments are marked as such in the text. At the time of review the advisory was not yet analysed in the NVD; severity and vector come from the advisory itself. We update this article as soon as Hetzner, distributions or vendors publish corrections or firmware updates.
Our approach at WZ-IT
For managed systems we proceed in this order when such a notice appears:
- Record the inventory: UEFI or BIOS, dedicated, cloud or virtual, boot path, planned reboots.
- Assess reboots: schedule necessary ones, postpone others, list automatic reboots.
- Put protection in place: for unavoidable reboots, create the ICMP block in the firewall and remove it afterwards.
- Watch: check vendors, distributions and hosters for firmware updates.
- Patch and verify: apply updates, reboot, document the state.
Monitoring runs 24/7, and the response to P1 incidents follows the service level. More on operations and monitoring: Managed operations for Hetzner, CVE monitoring and Proxmox support.
Unsure which of your servers run in UEFI mode and when reboots are due? In the server audit we record your systems, the boot path and the planned reboots. You receive a list of measures. View server audit · Book an intro call (free and non-binding)
Further guides
- Why companies need CVE monitoring
- PHP2Shell: CVE-2026-109618, affected software and measures
- Nextcloud built-in CODE Server: command injection without login (CVE-2026-110447)
- Managed operations for Hetzner
- CVE monitoring
Sources
- GitHub advisory GHSA-99cj-7hg9-mp4m: CVE-2026-97631, EDK II
- EDK II pull request 13302: Fix ICMP buffer overflow in IPv4/IPv6 handle
- Hetzner Status: CVE-2026-97631 - critical security vulnerability in the EDK II UEFI firmware component
- Hetzner Docs: firewall for dedicated servers
- Hetzner Docs: creating a Cloud Firewall
- Debian Security Tracker: CVE-2026-97631
- Ubuntu Security: CVE-2026-97631













